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Introduction 
But where, if not in school and workplace, is society built and changed?1 
In The Real World of Technology, the renowned Canadian physicist Ursula Franklin 
described the idea of technology as practice, a way of organising work and people. In 
her view, technology is not ‘‘the sum of the artifacts, of the wheels and gears, of 
the rails and electronic transmitters’’ but rather a system: ‘‘technology involves 
organization, procedures, symbols, new words, equations, and, most of all, a 
mindset’’. For Franklin, many recent developments in technology represent profound 
and violent transformations in human society. Significantly, moreover, she suggested 
that nothing short of a global reformation of major social forces can provide security 
for the world and its citizens, a reformation which seems, according to her analysis, 
to need the expertise and imagination of the legal profession: 
Such a development will require the redefinition of rights and 
responsibilities, and the setting of limits to power and control. There 
have to be completely different criteria for what is permissible and what is 
not. Central to any new order that can shape and direct technology and 
human destiny will be a renewed emphasis on the concept of justice. 
The viability of technology, like democracy, depends in the end on the 
  
practice of justice and on the enforcement of limits to power.2 
In the context of our general reassessment of legal education and the legal 
profession, Franklin’s emphasis on the practice of justice offers an important 
challenge. To what extent can legal education resist the demands of the market 
which have so captured the ethos of legal practice, if not all of those who are legal 
practitioners? To what extent do legal educators have tools and strategies, as well as 
ideas, to challenge dominant ideologies of corporate (legal) agendas? Do law teachers 
have a responsibility to join (or lead?) voices that resist defining the world in terms 
of market pressures and the demands of globalisation? 
Franklin’s ideas provide the context for some reflections in this paper about 
gender equality in the legal profession. The paper is part of a larger project, 
examining both historical and contemporary contexts for women lawyers, which 
seeks to map the intersection between the entry of women to the legal profession 
and related developments in social equality movements and in the ‘formation’ of 
professional culture in law. It is also a work-in-progress about the relationships 
between legal education and the culture of the legal profession. The paper begins 
with a brief overview of recent literature about women in law, and then focuses on 
the recommendations of the task force established by the Canadian Bar Association 
to promote greater gender equality in the law and the legal profession in Canada in 
1993.3 One recommendation suggested that law firms should engage in seminars 
about issues of gender equality, and as a result, I was requested to design and 
implement a series of seminars for three of the largest law firms in Toronto over a 
period of 4 years in the late 1990s. In earlier writing,4 I have focused on the special 
pedagogical challenges involved in such educational programming, and the need for 
problem-solving approaches quite different from traditional forms of continuing 
education for lawyers. 
In this paper, I examine some perspectives on lawyering which seem important 
to an assessment of the role of education in fostering greater equality in the legal 
  
profession. In this context, Ursula Franklin’s insights about the impact of technology 
offer ways of thinking about these challenges in terms of goals of building and 
changing society; as her perceptive question asks: ‘‘where, if not in school and 
workplace, is society built and changed?’’ 
Studies on women in law: problems and possibilities 
Women have been becoming lawyers in Canada for more than a century,5 yet, until 
relatively recently, women have represented only a tiny minority of lawyers and an 
even smaller number within the judiciary.6 Statistics assembled by the CBA task 
force indicated that the percentage of women members of the legal profession 
increased dramatically in all parts of Canada after 1970. By 1993, the task force 
report stated that women lawyers comprised 27% of the practising profession, 
although only 12% of federally-appointed judges; the report also concluded that 
women were generally under-represented in private practice and over-represented 
among those employed in government.7 This general pattern of increasing numbers 
of women members of the legal profession and the judiciary in Canada appears to 
be similar to trends in other Western jurisdictions. As a result, there has been a 
noticeable increase in scholarly attention to women’s entry to the legal profession, 
both monitoring the rate of this changing demography and attempting to assess its 
potential to change the profession’s traditional (male) culture. For example, in her 
comparative essay about women lawyers in several different countries around the 
world, Carrie Menkel-Meadow confirmed the trend of increasing numbers of women 
lawyers almost everywhere in the world. However, she also posed a question about 
the meaning of increased numbers of women lawyers, suggesting that whether 
women will be changed by the legal profession, or whether the legal profession will 
be changed by the increased presence of women is a different—and more important— 
question.8 
In the 1990s, legal scholars in a number of jurisdictions have examined the 
experiences of women as lawyers and tried to assess their impact on law and the 
  
legal profession. For example, Clare McGlynn’s 1998 study of women members of 
the legal profession in the United Kingdom documented the barriers and 
opportunities which continue to exist, as well as women’s perseverance and 
optimism in personal stories of their experiences in academe, and as solicitors, 
barristers and judges.9 McGlynn also argued that it is necessary to connect 
the concerns and struggles of these individual women lawyers to broader, 
institutional arrangements: ‘‘the economic structure of the firm and the legal 
profession, the nature of the law and legal culture, [and . . .] the fact that women 
as a whole are disadvantaged in society as well as in the legal academy and 
profession’’.10 
In another British study, Hilary Sommerlad and Peter Sanderson explored the 
experiences of women solicitors and the institutional and cultural barriers to their 
participation in the legal profession.11 Similarly, Mona Harrington’s 1993 study of 
women lawyers in the United States provided an analysis of structural factors 
constraining women lawyers’ roles, and examples from the lives of women lawyers 
illustrating the complexity of their individual choices within these constraints.12 
Harrington identified barriers in the nature of law, legal education, and the culture 
of legal practice and law firms. She also suggested that media presentations of 
women lawyers too often ignore real problems; as a result, for women lawyers who 
perceive systemic double standards and discrimination, the problem is ‘‘to find a 
way to speak about them when the norms say that good women lawyers, successful 
women lawyers, see no such problems’’.13 
Harrington’s conclusions in the USA are, on the whole, more optimistic than 
Margaret Thornton’s study of women lawyers in Australia—where she characterised 
women lawyers as ‘‘fringe-dwellers of the jurisprudential community’’.14 For 
Thornton, the reality of legal work at the present time constitutes a formidable 
barrier to changes which would effect gender equality goals; as she concluded, 
‘‘neither an increase in the number of women nor the passing of time can provide 
an automatic remedy’’.15 In such a context, she suggested that women who ‘‘make 
  
it in a man’s world’’ can do so only by assimilating the traditional (male) 
characteristics of the profession. In terms of effecting goals of gender 
equality, ‘‘there is nothing potentially radical about such women because they 
do not wish to change any aspect of legal practice as it is . . .’’;16 moreover, 
according to Thornton, conformity on the part of some women lawyers to the 
traditional culture of the profession confirms for many that gender is not an issue, 
a conclusion which absolves the profession from taking any initiatives that might 
further gender equality goals. 
Although Thornton’s analysis is pessimistic, it is supported by the conclusions 
of other scholars. For example, the 1995 study by Bernard Lentz and David Laband 
in the USA provided an assessment of thousands of responses to the National Survey 
of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction administered by the American Bar Association in 
1984 and again in 1990.17 Using pay and promotion criteria, the authors concluded 
that there was little overt discrimination against women lawyers in the United States, 
a finding which they acknowledged to be different from the conclusions of some 
other studies. However, they also asserted that differences in rates of pay or 
promotion would be ‘‘relatively easy to prove in a court of law’’, thus making these 
forms of discrimination risky.18 Instead, Lentz and Laband argued that forms of 
discriminatory behaviour against women lawyers were much more subtle and covert, 
making them harder to identify and challenge: 
Relative to comparable men lawyers, women lawyers report a sense of 
powerlessness in the workplace, and they do not believe that their 
performance is evaluated on the basis of merit. . . . [Female] lawyers 
apparently experience subtle discrimination on margins that are not 
easily provable in a court of law. . . . Given that those women who are 
most knowledgeable about their rights suffer multidimensional 
discrimination, the effectiveness of existing civil rights law is called into 
question.19 
  
In her recent study of relatively new entrants to the legal profession in the 
Canadian province of British Columbia, Joan Brockman also identified additional 
pressures as well as special limitations on career advancement for women lawyers, 
by contrast with their male colleagues.20 Although Brockman reported that men and 
women were initially drawn to the legal profession for quite similar reasons, her 
research revealed that they often experienced differing, gendered opportunities as 
members of the profession. Her interviewees provided data about differences in 
terms of ‘fitting in’ the profession, their experiences of discrimination and sexual 
harassment, and challenges of balancing work and family life. There was also some 
evidence that women were more reluctant to embrace the adversarial nature of legal 
work with as much ease as men who were lawyers. Her study is also important 
because it specifically focused on newly-admitted lawyers; clearly if this group of 
lawyers is continuing to experience gendered differences in the practice of law, then 
it is not ‘just a matter of time’ before the situation will inevitably change for the 
better. As Brockman reported: 
Discrimination in the legal profession can come from a variety of sources.. . . 
[Some] men will discriminate against women simply because they are women. 
Although there was no measure of this in this study, the proportion of men who 
fell into this category seems to be small. Most of them are identified as 
belonging to the ‘old boys’club’, and are thought to be becoming relics of 
the past. However, according to some respondents, ‘baby dinosaurs’ are 
growing up to replace them. Some women in this study sacrificed their 
personal lives and sold their souls to their law firms in order to become 
partners. They were being let go with glowing recommendations, rather than 
being invited into partnerships. The men who were poised for partnership, on 
the other hand, saw little standing in their way. It is difficult to conclude that 
the legal profession has rid itself of discrimination.21 
 
  
Brockman’s study is also important because it takes account of links between 
gender equality in the legal profession and in the broader society, and because it 
recognises how personal ‘choices’ on the part of women lawyers must be understood 
within a social context.22 In this way, Brockman’s study focuses on systemic, 
structural barriers which constrain opportunities for women lawyers more than for 
men who are lawyers—and on the resulting need for structural changes to overcome 
them. These conclusions in the Canadian context are similar to those of Sommerlad 
and Sanderson in the United Kingdom;23 as they argued, a strategy which supports 
women members of the legal profession must be ‘multi-pronged’, including measures 
to foster childcare provision, initiatives to bring more women into public bodies, 
and codes of practice (with procedures for monitoring and enforcing them) for 
public employees and also for firms which contract with the State.24 
All of these studies about women members of the legal profession recognised, at 
least to some extent, the broader context of changes within the profession, some of 
which continue to exacerbate women’s opportunities as lawyers. Yet, to some extent, 
the emerging literature about critical changes in the nature and processes of legal 
work25 has tended to exist in isolation from much of this literature about women 
lawyers (and other recent entrants to the profession): a kind of ‘two solitudes’ in 
critical legal scholarship. One exception to this approach is the longitudinal study of 
some Toronto law firms undertaken by sociologists John Hagan and Fiona Kay in the 
early 1990s to examine the impact of gender in survey data about the experiences of 
men and women lawyers in relation to: initial articling placements, progression to 
partnership, work and family conflicts, billing practices, and satisfaction levels.26 They 
concluded that the profession of law had become ‘‘a contested domain’’ by the end of 
the 1980s, with increased opportunities at the entry-level for both male and female 
lawyers but a shrinking proportion of partnership opportunities: a ‘‘glass ceiling’’ 
which ‘‘became an increasing reality for women but also for men’’: 
The practice of law became much more highly centralized and concentrated 
  
in large firms during the 1970s and 1980s. . . . [The growth rate of lawyers 
accelerated in private firms, government and business, but it also] involved, 
in relative terms, a shrinking pool of centralized and concentrated 
partnerships in large firms, with increasing numbers of lawyers in 
intermediate and lower positions. In short, this was a period of growth 
with a ceiling on upward outcomes. . . . Although the actual numbers of 
women and men lawyers at partnership levels of these firms 
increased in absolute terms during this period, their relative shares of 
partnership positions declined, and this ceiling effect was more 
pronounced for women than for men. During this period, men and 
women were developing careers in a legal profession whose parameters 
were changing in ways that traditional conceptions of professional 
autonomy would not predict.27 
Hagan and Kay’s study offers a careful analysis of competing explanations for 
the differing experiences of men and women who are lawyers. In particular, they 
examined the explanation that gendered experiences among lawyers occur primarily 
as a result of different choices being made by men and women about their careers 
in the legal profession. According to this explanation, women lawyers who experience 
a relative lack of career progress have made ‘choices’ to invest less in their careers 
than in their families, by contrast with male lawyers.28 Significantly, this explanation 
for the different experiences of men and women lawyers assigns responsibility for 
choices to individual lawyers—if women lawyers wish to succeed, it is simply a 
matter of them behaving more like men in the legal profession. According to this 
theory, women lawyers bear individual responsibility for improving their career 
options; there is no need for the profession itself to change. Thus, in relation to 
Menkel-Meadow’s question in her comparative study, the ‘different choices’ theory 
suggests that the answer is that the profession will change (some) women, but that 
the entry of women will not change the profession.29 
  
Yet, according to the study conducted by Hagan and Kay, even when women 
invested in their careers to the same extent as men, women lawyers were not rewarded 
at levels comparable to male lawyers; thus, explanations for women lawyers’ relative 
disadvantage in the profession based on ‘different choices’ were rendered 
unpersuasive.30 Instead, they argued that gender stratification theory, an 
explanation focusing on the structural constraints of law practice and legal culture, 
and the extent to which they impose constraints on women lawyers’ choices, was 
more persuasive. Their focus on a more structural approach shifts attention ‘‘away 
from employees in order to focus on employers who are the source of many of their 
problems’’.31 Using this approach, Hagan and Kay recommended the adoption of 
broadly-based initiatives, including systematic tracking of firms’ partnership 
decisions; tax incentives and other governmental policies to create more workplace 
flexibility; support from professional associations in designing ways to minimise 
work/family conflicts; education and prevention programmes; and the development 
of innovative model policies by law societies.32 As is evident, these 
recommendations do not focus primarily on the ‘choices’ of individual lawyers, 
but rather on systemic change in the practices of law firms and other legal 
institutions. Adopting this theory leads to a different response to Menkel 
Meadow’s question: pursuant to the theory of gender stratification, it will be necessary 
for the profession to change as a result of the entry of women.33 
Yet, although Hagan and Kay, like other scholars of the legal profession, have 
suggested a need for change in the legal profession, it is less clear exactly how these 
necessary changes will occur. Particularly if appropriate changes depend on the 
intervention of firm managers, law societies, or other professional associations, it 
will be necessary to convince them of the long term benefits of gender equality 
initiatives, including employer self-interest in retaining women lawyers.34 
Significantly, Hagan and Kay recommended education programmes for firms 
and other legal employers about the nature and consequences of gender 
inequality for the profession, a recommendation also included in the 1993 
  
report35 of the CBA task force—and the catalyst for my seminars for Toronto law 
firms in the late 1990s. 
 
Educating the profession: Touchstones for Change 
The CBA task force recognised that its report was being presented in a context of 
significant change in the structure and organisation of legal work in Canada, 
and elsewhere.36 Indeed, one of the most interesting features of the report is its 
characterisation of the challenge of gender equality in the legal profession as an 
integral part of the re-shaping of the profession. For example, in the introductory 
comments of the task force chair, former Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, the problem was presented as a problem about identity for 
members of the legal profession in relation to these new developments: 
[The entry of women to the legal profession] ‘shook up’ the profession and 
men as well as women were forced to confront issues to which they had 
never given really serious thought before. . . . Lawyers realized that this was 
a time for moral and intellectual stock-taking, for taking a cold dispassionate 
look at where their profession was going. How was their profession faring 
in the larger context of society? Was it a profession they were proud to 
belong to? Or had it become a little tarnished over the years? Had it, as 
some suggested, become ‘too commercialized’? Were people now in it for 
the money? Were we still the moral and intellectual leaders in our 
communities or were we just high-priced technicians at the beck and 
call of the corporate elite? In sum, did the profession still warrant the 
description ‘noble and learned’?37 
Although phrased rhetorically, Justice Wilson’s questions clearly characterised 
goals of gender equality as part of an overall professional commitment to justice;38 
for her, lawyers have independent responsibilities to promote justice, not merely 
their (corporate) clients’ interests. Although not everyone would agree with this 
  
characterisation of the challenge, there can be no doubt or ambiguity about the 
nature of the professional values adopted by the CBA report. For Justice Wilson 
and the task force, ideas about justice were fundamental to concepts of lawyering. 
In the face of often overwhelming and competing pressures on lawyers to meet 
demands of global corporatism, such a stance may appear misguided, naive, even 
hopeless. Yet, since it was these underlying principles in the task force report 
which resulted in the gender equality seminars for Toronto law firms, the seminar 
experiment provides an interesting opportunity to examine this educational initiative 
in the context of legal practice demands. Equally significantly, it may be important 
to assess the extent to which the task force report can be characterised as an 
important ‘voice of resistance’ within the legal profession, and/or the extent to which 
it offers ideas and strategies critical to values and goals of legal education. 
The Touchstones report systematically examined current policies and practices 
affecting women lawyers in private law firms and also in government, academe, 
administrative tribunals and the judiciary,39 and made a long list of recommendations 
(some quite controversial) which were subsequently considered in public discussions 
by the National Council of the Canadian Bar Association.40 Touchstones suggested 
that any transformation of the profession41 would require change at a number of 
different levels: ‘‘behaviours, attitudes, institutional policies and practices, and in 
the structure of the profession itself ’’.42 Accordingly, the report concluded that the 
process of change would require the profession to question the way that law is 
practised as well as the profession’s assumptions underlying the status quo.43 And 
significantly, the report identified ‘‘education about the nature of gender inequality 
in the legal profession [as] crucial’’: 
What is needed for the legal profession is ‘remedial human rights 
jurisprudence’ accessible to non-specialists. . . . These messages should be 
repeated until they form the basis of a common understanding of our legal 
duties to our colleagues in the profession and beyond. . . . We must 
  
develop a culture of ‘problem-solving’ for our own profession. Lawyers are 
trained to criticize and demolish arguments. In order to achieve gender 
equality, we must learn how to find creative solutions for our own 
internal problems.44 
The emphasis on education in the Touchstones report, as a strategy for 
accomplishing institutional change in the legal profession in relation to gender 
equality goals, is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the emphasis on 
education suggests that current problems of gender inequality in the profession are 
mainly the result of a lack of knowledge; as a result, Touchstones assumes that the 
provision of knowledge through education will engender appropriate changes. 
In this way, education about gender equality becomes a means to an end, a 
process that is somehow separate from issues of power, economic resources, or 
human will within the profession. Second, the emphasis on education appears 
to assume that it is possible to provide information about the jurisprudence on 
gender equality which will per se engender new and different practices within the 
profession, as if education about gender equality were no different from 
information about new legislative amendments which must be incorporated 
into legal practice. This approach tends to underestimate the power of entrenched 
ideas about gender roles in the profession, and in the larger society.45 As well, the 
report’s emphasis on education to remedy gender inequality overlooks the extent 
to which these challenges within the profession may require fundamental re-
structuring of institutions, as well as profound changes in individual attitudes and 
behaviours. At the very least, achieving such goals requires highly specialised 
education. 
In spite of these potential limitations, however, several Toronto firms responded 
to the Touchstones recommendations and took up the challenge of providing education 
seminars about gender equality for several years after 1993.46 Although all of 
the firms had well-established programmes for continuing legal education, they 
  
approached the arrangements for offering these seminars with special care. All of 
the firms had conducted some internal surveys of their members’ experiences on a 
variety of issues related to gender equality, so that the firms were able to identify 
some issues of special concern to be addressed by the programme. All the same, the 
creation of an appropriate seminar required a good deal of energy and creative 
pedagogy in the context of highly sophisticated and articulate members of the 
profession—many of whom had never (or hardly ever) analysed these issues before.47 
In assessing the seminars, and the role of education generally as a strategy for 
change, a number of constraints can be identified. For example, a one-time-only 
seminar of two-and-a-half hours is unlikely to accomplish more than an introduction 
to the issues and problems, especially in the context of education about gender 
equality, where ideas may challenge longstanding attitudes, traditional and 
wellestablished practices, and stereotypical views about gender roles. Indeed, 
gender equality programmes which go beyond providing just information to 
challenge fundamental values, attitudes and behaviour require time for reflection 
and further discussion, a commodity all too rare in the environment of most large 
law firms. As I conducted these (perhaps somewhat unique) educational 
programmes for law firms over a number of years, the reality of workplace 
demands for lawyers in these firms meant that gender equality education 
frequently had to be ‘fitted into’ other, more important, pressures on them. 
Moreover, it became clear that solutions to problems of gender inequality in 
legal practice could be addressed only if they did not challenge the priority 
accorded to work demands, or if they could be easily accommodated within the 
prevailing law firm culture. Thus, to the extent that the literature suggests that 
gender equality goals may require major changes to practices and cultures, they are 
unlikely to be adopted readily in law firms. Such a conclusion limits the 
usefulness of educational programmes to the provision of some basic 
conceptions of gender inequality issues; they appear to be much less useful as 
strategies for accomplishing substantive change in the legal profession. 
  
Lawyers’ work and ‘asynchronicity’: (re)defining justice and gender 
equality 
As Margaret Thornton suggested in her analysis of lawyers’ work in Australia, 
strategies for accomplishing change in the legal profession must confront the nature 
of legal work and the culture within which legal work is done. Thornton’s study is 
important for its sustained focus on the reality of legal work and the day-to-day 
culture of the profession in the 1990s. She also identified how both the nature of 
legal work and law firms’ expectations have been changing in recent decades, exactly 
the same period in which women have begun to enter the legal profession in 
significant numbers: 
. . . [W]hile acceptance of women within legal practice is hailed as a sign of 
progress, the dramatic changes that have occurred simultaneously in the 
structuring of law firms have rendered the advances a pyrrhic victory. The 
lawyer in the modern corporate law firm is subject to disciplinary practices 
that are a far cry from the claimed independence and autonomy of the 
past. The filling in of time sheets and the need to generate specific levels 
of income signify the most notorious manifestations of control. . . . The 
focus on income generation, effected through the phenomenon of billable 
hours, engenders a great deal of ambivalence among women, as employed 
solicitors are expected to dedicate themselves totally to their careers and to 
the firm. . . . Loyalty to the firm includes never complaining about its 
practices to an outside body   48 
Thornton identified these changes in terms of the increasing ‘corporatism’ of 
law practice and the ‘commodification’ of lawyers, and revealed these developments 
as controlling factors in shaping the nature of practice and the culture of the modern 
legal profession. Similarly, Maureen Cain and Christine Harrington argued that 
‘‘lawyers’ work shapes as well as reinforces the power relations in society’’ and legal 
work most often ‘translates’ the needs of capital into legal rights.49 In such a context, 
  
as Thornton argued, law firm ‘corporatism’ both undermines equality goals and 
renders gender invisible.50 
These insights about legal practice are important in the context of Ursula 
Franklin’s analysis of ‘new’ technologies and their ‘asynchronicity’. She defined this 
term as the opposite of ‘synchonicity’: 
. . . [While] synchronicity evokes the presence of sequences and patterns, 
fixed intervals or periodicities, coordination and synchronization, 
asynchronicity indicates the decoupling of activities from their functional 
time or space patterns. . . . The current widespread use of computer 
networks . . . has led to . . . the prevalence of asynchronicity, indicated 
by the loosening, if not the abandonment, of previously compulsory time 
and space patterns. This is a most significant change. No longer is one 
pattern superseded by another pattern; the change now appears as a 
move from an existing pattern to no discernable structure. I consider 
the evolving destructuring by asynchronicity as an extremely important, if not the 
crucial facet of the new electronic technologies.51 
For Franklin, the role of asynchronicity in ‘‘unravelling social and political 
patterns’’ is troubling. As she explained, the development of the ‘bitsphere’ (the 
world of technological mechanisms) and its impact on the ‘biosphere’ (the organic 
and human world) has created fundamental changes and challenges for the world as 
we know it. For the purposes of this paper, moreover, Ursula Franklin’s concept of 
asynchronicity ‘coincides’ in significant ways with Margaret Thornton’s ideas about 
‘technocentrism’ in the work and legal education of lawyers. Indeed, Thornton’s list 
of features of lawyers’ work is remarkably similar to the factors identified by Franklin 
as elements of ‘asynchronicity’: 
Ω legal rules assume neutral rationality, thereby disqualifying all other 
knowledge; 
Ω legal work requires acceptance of the normativity of existing practices; there 
  
is no encouragement to challenge existing practices or to see things in new 
ways; 
Ω paid work is seen as the major focus of human activity and good lawyers are 
those who work the longest hours; 
Ω adoption of billable hours in large law firms is not so much related to the 
product as it is to providing a means of control over the work and lives of 
lawyers; and 
Ω increasing specialisation of legal work means that almost no one sees a 
transaction from beginning to end; as a result, there is a separation of work 
being done from accountability/responsibility in terms of its goals or its overall 
impact. 
Thornton argued that the impact of technocentrism on legal work and legal 
education was an ‘‘ideological desensitization’’.52 As Charles Derber argued, this 
concept suggests that legal practitioners are ‘‘absolved from ethical responsibility’’ 
when they serve dubious interests: ‘‘technocentrism permits the normalization of 
property and profit-making enterprises’’ and similar views in relation to sexism and 
racism.53 Thus: 
Law students need to undergo a process of ideological desensitisation in 
preparation for practice. Hence, issues of ethics and justice are likely to be 
given short shrift and to be treated as subordinate to mastery of technocratic 
rules. Derber reports that studies involving first-year students in a wide 
range of professions, including law, reveal a rapid shift from a predominantly 
moral orientation to a technocratic one ... 54 
In such a context, it appears at first glance that the CBA task force completely 
failed to appreciate the importance of legal work and its culture in large law firms. 
Although Touchstones acknowledged the existence of workplace demands, it did not 
fully accept the priority presently accorded to work in law firm culture. Instead, 
  
Touchstones argued that the primary focus in the profession should be the 
requirements of justice, and that the achievement of gender equality goals was a 
matter of justice.55 Challenging the idea that lawyers must respond fully to market 
demands, Touchstones argued that the legal profession must take seriously its 
public role, aspiring to meet the traditional ideal of lawyers as ‘‘noble and learned’’, 
and refusing to succumb to the role of ‘‘high priced technicians’’, responding 
only to the needs of the corporate elite. In this way, the report reveals the validity 
of Hagan and Kay’s conclusion that the profession in the 1990s constituted ‘‘a 
contested domain’’;56 Touchstones’ conception of the profession and its 
responsibility for justice directly challenged dominant ideas of the legal 
profession as market-driven and tending to corporatism and commodification, 
technocentrism and asynchronicity. 
Not surprisingly in this context, as I reflected on my experiences with the 
gender equality seminars for major law firms, I initially concluded that the CBA 
recommendations were simply wrong, or at least seriously misguided, even naive. 
Although my criticisms may be too strong, I remain convinced that the CBA task 
force failed to create an imaginative strategic plan for achieving change in the legal 
profession in relation to its goals of gender equality. At the same time, however, it 
is arguable that the CBA report represents a voice about justice within the Canadian 
legal profession, a voice which presents both challenge and resistance to the dominant 
discourse of technocentrism. As my experiences with these gender equality seminars 
in Toronto law firms reveal, the challenge of achieving justice goals in a technocentric 
legal universe remains daunting: the challenge of ‘fitting’ gender equality goals 
( justice) into lawyers’ work demands without requiring any changes to existing 
conditions of work—or any challenges to the prevailing culture of legal work in these 
firms. 
One concrete example illustrates the problem, and the merits of Franklin’s 
different approach, very well. In discussions about evening work, an issue that arose 
  
frequently in these seminars, the problem was usually presented as a question about 
the need for evening work; not surprisingly, most of the time, lawyers in these major 
firms accepted that work during the evening was essential. In the context of our 
discussions, however, it became clear that both male and female lawyers who were 
the parents of small children in practice left the firm about 6 p.m. in order to spend 
time with the children; and that by about 8 or 8:30 p.m., both male and female 
lawyers returned to work. Significantly, however, male lawyers, much more 
frequently than their female counterparts, physically returned to the law firms; 
female lawyers were more likely to plug into a technological equivalent through 
a home computer system. Both males and females with small children 
frequently worked until midnight. However, it was only the male lawyers who 
were ‘visible’ at work at the firm late at night. Indeed, compounding the gender 
equality issue, female lawyers sometimes indicated that their resistance to 
returning to the office was related to the lack of safety at night in underground 
parking garages in downtown Toronto, the location of most of these large law 
firms. As a result, it was often possible to have conversations about why male 
lawyers, who had increased ‘face’ time in the firm, were thought to have worked 
harder than female lawyers, particularly when all of these lawyers might well 
have their work products completed by 8 a.m. on the following morning. Why, 
we pondered, was it so important for people to be physically present in the late 
evenings at these firms? 
Such questions raise a number of interesting issues. Certainly, in the context of 
the law firm seminars, it was possible to identify biases based on physical presence. 
Indeed, I often tried to promote the idea that the issue should be whether the work is 
done, and not the location in which the work is done. By contrast, Ursula Franklin’s 
message is that it is important to think about the need for community in workplaces, and 
the extent to which physical presence is an important part of a sense of community. 
What is perhaps critical here, however, is the fact that in none of the seminars were we 
  
able to address the question of why people have to work such long hours in legal firms! 
Is all of this work really necessary? And if there is a community during the hours from 8 
am to 6 pm, why is the community which is involved in ‘night work’ (substantially male 
lawyers) so much more significant? To what extent does working the longest hours mean 
that we are more (or less?) efficient, more (or less?) capable, more (or less?) expert? If 
someone can do the work and go home at 6 o’clock, without working in the evenings, 
why does that make them ‘a less effective, less accomplished lawyer’? These kinds of 
questions reveal a paradox in the CBA recommendations and in my gender equality 
seminars. On the one hand, we succeeded in revealing that current practices are not 
unchangeable, while on the other hand we failed to take the work requirements, and 
the culture of work requirements, seriously enough. We failed to ask fundamental 
questions about what we are doing. And why. 
Such an analysis suggests that strategies for accomplishing change in the legal 
profession must take account of the fundamental imperatives of the work itself, and 
especially the culture within which legal work is done. The CBA report assumed that 
lawyers’ responsibility to achieve justice meant that they would embrace principles 
of gender equality willingly once they understood them as important to 
accomplishing the goals of a just society. Such an assumption does not sufficiently 
recognise the power of workplace demands in the law firm culture: even lawyers 
who accept responsibility for ‘justice’ goals need to take seriously the competing 
demands of work and legal culture in creating appropriate strategies. 
Thus, while the CBA report supported a reconceptualising of the profession in 
terms of its primary commitment to justice, it did not sufficiently confront the most 
fundamental barrier to change: the nature of legal work. As a result, the report failed 
to respond to the power of work demands to sideline other goals, including those of 
gender equality. In this context, educational programmes about gender equality 
might represent another voice in the ‘contested domain’ about the nature of the 
legal profession, but they do not constitute an effective strategy for achieving 
  
substantive change. Thus, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of change, 
without minimising the power of existing barriers to curtail and constrain it, and to 
understand that educational programmes about gender equality for the legal 
profession are not a panacea. 
And this is where Ursula Franklin’s lifelong work is so significant. Undoubtedly, 
resistant voices of justice in the legal profession are the equivalent of Franklin’s 
earthworm theory of social change: the voices which prepare the soil for change to 
happen: 
I have long subscribed to what I call Franklin’s earthworm theory of social 
change. Social change will not come to us like an avalanche down the 
mountain. Social change will come through seeds growing in well prepared 
soil—and it is we, like the earthworms, who prepare the soil. We also seed 
thoughts and knowledge and concern. We realize there are no guarantees 
as to what will come up. Yet we do know that without the seeds and the 
prepared soil nothing will grow at all. I am convinced that we are indeed 
already in a period in which this movement from below is becoming more 
and more articulate, but what is needed is a lot more earthworming ....... 57 
In my view, it is altogether obvious that in the legal system, as in the social 
world, change will not come from the mountain top but rather from earthworming: 
the preparation of the soil by individuals who are prepared to challenge the 
mainstream. In such a context, thoughtful law teachers might choose to emulate the 
earthworms: Where, if not in school and workplace, is society built and changed? 
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